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The federal government’s power to tax is omnipotent.  Federal taxes can be assessed in 
any amount on anything or anyone for any reason.2   For all practical purposes, the Constitution 
prescribes only one limit on the federal government’s power to tax:  the Uniformity Clause, 
which requires that indirect taxes, such as income and excise taxes, be “uniform throughout the 
United States.”3  Uniformity should not be confused, however, with fairness or equality.  There 
is no requirement that rich people pay the same tax as poor or that oil companies pay the same 
1Professor of Law, Appalachian School of Law.  Director, Native American Tax Law 
Institute.  This Article was presented at the 2003 Summer Forum, University of Tennessee 
College of Law.
2See, e.g., Penn Mut. Indem. Co. v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 16, 19 (3d Cir. 1960) (the 
taxing power of Congress is exhaustive and embraces every conceivable power of taxation); 
United States v. Richardson, 107 F. Supp. 38, 39 (E.D. Mich. 1952) (Congress may select any 
object, occupation, or transaction as the subject matter of a tax).
3U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Constitution also requires that direct taxes to be 
apportioned among the states, but this limitation has little practical significance and was largely 
repealed by the 16th Amendment.  See Section I.B., infra.  In addition, the federal government is 
barred from taxing exports, but this limitation has a very limited scope.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, 
cl. 5.  See Section I.A., infra.
2tax as pharmaceutical companies or that married couples pay the same tax as singles.  The 
Uniformity Clause merely requires geographic uniformity; it is violated, therefore, only if the 
federal government imposes a different tax on the residents of, say, Tennessee, than it imposes 
on the residents of, say, Virginia.
It is exceedingly rare for a federal tax law to violate the Uniformity Clause.4  The Internal 
Revenue Code does not fix different taxes for different states, for Congress has carefully crafted 
the tax laws to avoid geographical distinctions.5  Unfortunately, the Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”) has not always been so careful.  In recent years, the IRS has adopted a practice of 
applying different tax laws to different states.  This occurs when the IRS issues a formal opinion 
declaring that it will not enforce certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code in states located 
within certain federal circuits.6
4In fact, the Supreme Court has never used the Uniformity Clause to invalidate a tax law.  
Thomson Multimedia, Inc. v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1325 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2002).
5But see United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 (1983) (court upheld tax on domestic oil 
despite the fact that it exempted oil produced “from a well located on the northerly side of the 
divide of the Alaska-Aleutian Range and at least 75 miles from the nearest point on the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline System”); Amoco Oil Co. v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340-41 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade 1999) (court upheld Harbor Maintenance Tax despite exemptions for Alaska and 
Hawaii, where exemptions were not discriminatory in nature).
6For examples of such opinions, see Section II, infra.
3The author of this Article submits that the IRS’s non-uniform application of the tax law 
violates the Uniformity Clause of the United States Constitution.  In an endeavor to substantiate 
this hypothesis, Section I of this Article will analyze the constitutional restrictions on the federal 
government’s power to tax and the effect the 16th Amendment had on those restrictions.  Section 
II will offer examples of the IRS’s practice of applying tax laws in a non-uniform manner.  
Section III will demonstrate why the IRS’s practice violates the Uniformity Clause.  Section IV 
will propose a practical and constitutional solution to the IRS’s arguably unconstitutional 
practice.
Whether the IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax law violates the Uniformity 
Clause is an issue of first impression.  It has not been addressed by courts, except for an oblique 
reference in Peony Park v. Webber,7 but that court sidestepped the issue by refusing to assume, 
despite unambiguous evidence, that the IRS was applying different tax laws in different states.8
It also has been largely ignored by scholars, but that is not altogether surprising, for tax scholars, 
as Professor Bittker explains, generally pay little attention to constitutional law:  “[I]n law school 
courses, once the instructor has finished flogging Eisner v. Macomber, the class usually moves 
7121 F. Supp. 690 (D. Neb. 1954). 
8Id. at 695 (“Insofar as the Commissioner adopted an enforcement policy contrary to the 
statute, the enforcement policy was unlawful.”).
4on to the ‘real’ issues of federal income taxation, leaving the Constitution, including the sixteen 
amendment, behind.”9
I. The Constitution’s Taxation Provisions
Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government did not possess the power to 
tax individuals or property.10  Rather, the federal government was forced to rely exclusively upon 
state  governments for revenue, a mechanism that quickly proved ineffectual:
9See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Constitutional Limits on the Taxing Power of the Federal 
Government, 41 TAX LAW. 3, 4 (1987).  Professor Bittker is Professor of Law Emeritus at Yale 
Law School and one of the leading tax scholars in America.    See also Leo P. Martinez, “To Lay 
and Collect Taxes”: The Constitutional Case for Progressive Taxation, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 111, 114 (1999) (noting “the existence of an uneasy relationship between constitutional law 
scholars and tax scholars”).
10E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 268 n.4 (1983) (“A major weakness of the system 
created by the Articles of Confederation was the central government’s inability to collect taxes 
directly.  Remedying this defect was thus one of the most important purposes of the 
Constitutional Convention.”) (citations omitted).  In the Articles of Confederation, the power to 
tax was conferred upon the states. ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VIII (“All charges of 
war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and 
allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common 
treasury, which shall be supplied by the several States, in proportion to the value of all land 
within each State, granted to or surveyed for any person, as such land and the buildings and 
5Congress could not, under the old confederation, raise money by 
taxes, be the exigencies ever so pressing and great.  They had no 
coercive authority—if they had, it must have been exercised 
against the delinquent states, which would be ineffectual, or 
terminate in a separation.  Requisitions were a dead letter, unless 
the state legislatures could be brought into action; and when they 
were, the sums raised were very disproportional.  Unequal 
contributions or payments engendered discontent, and fomented 
state-jealousy.11
The inability of the federal government to raise revenue was one of the reasons for the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787.12  At that convention, the Framers of our current Constitution 
vested in Congress broad, general powers to lay and collect taxes.13  These power are contained 
improvements thereon shall be estimated according to such mode as the United States in 
Congress assembled, shall from time to time direct and appoint.  The taxes for paying that 
proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority and direction of the Legislatures of the 
several States within the time agreed upon by the United States in Congress assembled.”). 
11Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 178 (1796) (upholding federal tax on 
carriages as a uniform indirect tax).
12Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 595-96 (1880) (“Many of the provisions of the 
Articles of Confederation of 1777 were embodied in the existing organic law.  They provided for 
a common treasury and the mode of supplying it with funds.  The latter was by requisitions upon 
the several States.  The delays and difficulties in procuring the compliance of the States, it is 
known, was one of the causes that led to the adoption of the present Constitution.”).
13U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
6in the first clause of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which provides:  “The Congress 
shall have the Power To Lay and Collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts 
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States. . . .”14
The federal government’s authority to tax “is exhaustive and embraces every conceivable 
power of taxation.”15 The expansive nature this power was acknowledged by the Supreme Court 
as early as 1796, when Justice Paterson observed that it was “obviously the intention of the 
14U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  The Supreme Court has held that Congress’s power to tax 
is not limited to the other enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8, but rather Congress may 
impose any tax that is in the general welfare of the nation.  United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 
65-66 (1936).  In  Veazie Bank v. Fenno, the Court held that the Framers intended to give to 
Congress the power to tax in “its fullest extent.”  75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 547, 540 (1869).  The 
Court continued: 
The comprehensiveness of the power, thus given to Congress, may 
serve to explain, at least, the absence of any attempt by members 
of the Convention to define, even in debate, the terms of the grant. 
The words used certainly describe the whole power, and it was the 
intention of the Convention that the whole power should be 
conferred.  The definition of particular words, therefore, became 
unimportant.  Id. at 541.
15Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 12 (1915) (upholding 1913 income tax act).  
7framers of the Constitution that Congress should possess full power over every species of taxable 
property, except exports.”16  More than a century later, Justice Cardozo, elaborating on the 
breadth of the federal government’s power to tax, stated:  “The subject-matter of taxation open to 
the power of the Congress is as comprehensive as that open to the power of the states, though the 
method may at times be different. . . .  [It] include[s] every form of tax appropriate to 
sovereignty.”17
The Taxing Clause is construed liberally and flexibly in favor of the federal 
government.18  Any tax designed to promote the general welfare of the nation is constitutional, 
and it is for Congress, and not the courts, to decide which taxes promote the general welfare:  
16Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176.  The Court continued:  “The term taxes, is generical, and 
was made use of to vest in Congress plenary authority in all cases of taxation. The general 
division of taxes is into direct and indirect. Although the latter term is not to be found in the 
Constitution, yet the former necessarily implies it.  Indirect stands opposed to direct.”  Id.
17Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 581 (1937) (upholding taxes on 
employers pursuant to Social Security Act)..
18La Croix v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 817, 821 (W.D. Tenn. 1935) (“It is the opinion 
of this court that it was the purpose of the framers of the Constitution that this clause, giving the 
right to levy taxes to pay the public debts, provide for the common defense and general welfare, 
was to be applied as a liberal and flexible means of providing for the welfare of the United States 
in times of disaster; provided, of course, that no other and restraining clause was violated.”).
8“The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary 
power, not an exercise of judgment.”19  Specifically, the power to choose one welfare over 
another or a particular welfare over a general is vested in Congress.20  Accordingly, Congress has 
broad powers to tax for the general welfare so long as it does not violate other constitutional 
provisions:
as this court repeatedly has held, the power to tax carries with it the 
power to embarrass and destroy; may be applied to every object 
within its range in such measure as Congress may determine; 
enables that body to select one calling and omit another, to tax one 
19Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937) (upholding Social Security Act);
Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976) (“The basic principle that must govern an 
assessment of any constitutional challenge to a law providing for governmental payments of 
monetary benefits is well established.  Governmental decisions to spend money to improve the 
general public welfare in one way and not another are not confided to the courts.  The discretion 
belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an 
exercise of judgment.”).
20Davis, 301 U.S. at 640-41 (“The line must still be drawn between one welfare and 
another, between particular and general.  Where this shall be placed cannot be known through a 
formula in advance of the event.  There is a middle ground or certainly a penumbra in which 
discretion is at large.  The discretion, however, is not confided to the courts.  The discretion 
belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an 
exercise of judgment.  This is now familiar law.”).
9class of property and to forbear to tax another; and may be applied 
in different ways to different objects . . . .21
The federal government’s power to tax, however, is not without limits.  According to the 
Constitution, “Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of 
apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity.”22  Thus, the Constitution prescribes 
three limits on the federal government’s power to tax.23  The first is that Congress may not tax 
exports.24  The second is that capitation taxes and other direct taxes must be apportioned among 
21Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 256 (1920) (upholding federal income tax despite the fact 
that it effectively reduced the salaries of Article III judges, which the Constitution generally 
prohibits).
22Kelly v. Lewellyn, 274 F. 108, 110 (W.D. Pa. 1921); Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 174 
(“two rules are prescribed for [the power to tax], namely, uniformity and apportionment:  Three 
kinds of taxes, to wit, duties, imposts, and excises by the first rule, and capitation, or other direct 
taxes, by the second rule”).
23Tax laws are also subject to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.  Such clause 
are rarely used, however, to invalidate tax laws.  See, e.g., Mathews, 429 U.S. at 185 (Social 
Security Act, which treats males differently than females, does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause); Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 12 (1913 income tax act, which was retroactive, does not violate 
the Due Process Clause).  
24U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
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the several states based on population.25  The third limit is that duties, imposts, excises, and other 
indirect taxes must be uniform throughout the United States.26  In order to provide a complete 
25U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
26U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  In 1916, the Supreme Court observed that the 
requirements of apportionment and uniformity are not so much limitations upon the complete 
and all-embracing authority to tax, but simply regulations concerning the mode by which the 
plenary power is to be exerted.  Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 13.  Later decisions have called this 
liberal interpretation of the Uniformity Clause into question.  
The fact that the Supreme Court in 1916 categorized the 
Uniformity Clause as a regulation does not convince this Court that 
the Uniformity Clause is not also a limitation as the Supreme Court 
used the word in Flast.  The Uniformity Clause restricts the method 
by which the Congress can assess taxes.  Thus, it is a limitation on 
the means by which Congress can tax.  This view of the 
Uniformity Clause is consistent with other Supreme  Court 
decisions.  United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 80, 103 S.Ct. 
2239, 2242, 76 L.Ed.2d 427 (1983) (“The Uniformity Clause 
conditions Congress’s power to impose indirect taxes.”); Flint v. 
Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 150, 31 S. Ct. 342, 348, 55 L.Ed. 
389 (1911) (the Uniformity Clause allows Congress “to lay and 
11
picture of the constitutional limits on Congress’s power to tax, all three these limitations are 
examined in the next Section.  The Uniformity Clause, however, is the primary focus of this 
Article.
A. The Export Clause
The Export Clause plainly states:  “No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported 
from any State.”27  It categorically bars Congress from imposing taxes on exports.28  The Export 
collect . . . taxes, duties, imposts and excises, upon which the 
limitation is that they shall be uniform throughout the United 
States”); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 85, 20 S.Ct. 747, 765, 
44 L.Ed. 969 (1900) (“The tax imposed upon the distiller is in the 
nature of an excise, and the only limitation upon the power of 
Congress in the imposition of taxes of this character is that they 
shall be uniform throughout the United States.”)
Apache Bend Apartments, Ltd. v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1285, 1292 (N.D. Tex. 1988) 
(footnotes omitted).
27U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
28United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 362 (1998).  “The Clause, 
however, does not rule out a ‘user fee,’ provided that the fee lacks the attributes of a generally 
applicable tax or duty and is, instead, a charge designed as compensation for Government-
supplied services, facilities, or benefits.”  Id.
12
Clause “was originally proposed by delegates to the Federal Convention from the Southern 
States, who feared that the Northern States would control Congress and would use taxes and 
duties on exports to raise a disproportionate share of federal  revenues from the South.”29  To 
allay such fears,30 the Framers’ couched the Export Clause in unconditional language that 
protects all exports from federal tax burdens.31  Along with the Import-Export Clause,32 which 
29United States v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 859 (1996) (citing 2 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 95, 305-308, 359-363 (Max Farrand 
ed.,1966)).
30See, e.g., RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 28, at 307 (Mr. Gerry 
thought the legislature could not be trusted with such a power to tax exports.  It might ruin the 
Country.   It might be exercised partially, raising one and depressing another part of it.);  id. at 
305 (Mr. Mason urged the necessity of connecting with the power of levying taxes so that no tax 
should be laid on exports.).   
31International Bus. Machs., 517 U.S. at 859-60, Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 
292-93 (1901) (“So it is clear that the framers of the Constitution intended, not merely that 
exports should not be made a source of revenue to the national government, but that the national 
government should put nothing in the way of burden upon such exports.  If all exports must be 
free from national tax or duty, such freedom requires, not simply an omission of a tax upon the 
articles exported, but also a freedom from any tax which directly burdens the exportation; and, as 
we have shown, a stamp tax on a bill of lading, which evidences the export, is just as clearly a 
13
prohibits states, without the consent of Congress, from laying “any Imposts or Duties on Imports 
or Exports,” the Export Clause was “one of the compromises which . . . made possible the 
adoption of the Constitution.”33
“[T]he Export Clause . . . specifically prohibits Congress from regulating international 
commerce through export taxes, disallows any attempt to raise federal revenue from exports, 
[but] has no direct effect on the way the States treat imports and exports.”34  In other words, the 
Constitution “left to the states a greater power over exports than congress had, for by the ninth 
section of the first article, they were prohibited from taxing exports, without any qualification, 
even by the consent of the states; whereas, with the consent of congress, any state can  impose 
such a tax by law, subject to the conditions prescribed.”35
The Export Clause is not limited to taxes imposed exclusively on exports.  It also applies 
to “the imposition of a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory federal tax on goods in export 
burden on the exportation as a direct tax on the article mentioned in the bill of lading as the 
subject of the export.”). 
32U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
33Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 290 (invalidating a stamp tax on bills of lading).
34International Bus. Machs., 517 U.S. at 859.
35Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 153 (1837) 
(Baldwin, J., concurring).  See also Williams v. Fear, 179 U.S. 270, 276 (1900).
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transit.”36  That is, the Export Clause exempts from federal taxation not only export goods, but 
also services and activities closely related to the export process.37  Accordingly, even those taxes 
that are imposed equally on exports and imports or other articles of commerce may be prohibited 
by the Export Clause,38 for exports are not to be obstructed by the burdens of federal taxation.39
36International Bus. Machs., 517 U.S. at 859-60.
37International Bus. Machs., 517 U.S. at 846.
38International Bus. Machs., 517 U.S. at 860.  (“The better reading [of the Export 
Clause], that adopted by our earlier cases, is that the Framers sought to alleviate their concerns 
by completely denying to Congress the power to tax exports at all.”).  To determine whether a 
tax is an export tax, as compared to a general tax on property, a court must examine the 
immediacy of exportation and the proximity of the tax imposed to the value of the articles 
exported.  United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 907 F. Supp. 408, 417 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
1995), aff’d, 114 F.3d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1997), aff’d, 523 U.S. 360 (1998).
39R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Robertson, 14 F. Supp. 463, 464 (M.D.N.C. 1935).  
Although the Supreme Court has allowed states to impose nondiscriminatory taxes under the 
Import-Export Clause and the Commerce Clause, it has consistently barred all federal taxes, 
discriminatory and nondiscriminatory,  under the Export Clause.  International Bus. Machs., 517 
U.S. at 650-62.
15
The Export Clause does not, however, preclude federal taxation of pre-export goods and 
services.40  Thus, general excise taxes on property, such as a tax on all distilled spirits, and 
income taxes derived from the exporting business are not prohibited by the Export Clause,41 as 
that Clause applies only to taxes laid on exports or matters related to exports and not on taxes 
laid generally on the manufacture or handling of products.42
The Export Clause applies only to international commerce,43 and is limited to “goods.”44
It does not apply to passengers.45  Although the Export Clause is a genuine limitation on the 
40
“The true construction of the constitutional provision is that no burden by way of tax or 
duty can be cast upon the exportation of articles, and does not mean that articles exported are 
relieved from the prior ordinary burdens of taxation which rest upon all property similarly 
situated.”  Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418, 427 (1904). 
41Thompson v. United States, 142 U.S. 471 (1892) (upholding tax on distilled spirits, 
some of which are exported); William E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1918) (upholding 
income tax on profits derived from exporting goods).
42United States v. West Texas Cottonoil Co., 155 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1946) 
(upholding penalty on excess cotton, regardless of whether such cotton was sold in the United 
States or abroad).
43Florida Sugar Mktg. & Terminal Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 1331, 1335-37 
(Fed. Cir.2000) (finding Export Clause does not bar tax on interstate shipments).  Exports 
destined for U.S. territories are not subject to the Export Clause.  Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 
16
federal government’s power to tax, its scope is quite limited.46  It applies exclusively to taxes on 
the international exportation of goods.  As such, it plays no significant role in the IRS’s circuit-
specific application of the tax law, which, of course, is the focus this Article.47
324 U.S. 652 (1945) (exports to Philippines); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901) 
(exports to Puerto Rico).
44International Business Machs., 517 U.S. at 846, 848, 849, 855, 862; U.S. Shoe, 523 
U.S. at 367 (“the Export Clause allows no room for any federal tax, however generally 
applicable or nondiscriminatory, on goods in export transit.”).
45Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. United States, 200 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(“The passengers on Carnival’s cruise ships are neither ‘articles’ nor ‘goods.’   They are people.   
The application of the Harbor Tax to them would not involve the laying of any tax upon 
“Articles” exported from any state. ‘Articles’ and ‘goods’ relate to items of commerce, not 
people.  To apply the Export Clause to people would be inconsistent with the basic purpose of 
the Clause.”).
46The 16th Amendment had no effect on the Export Clause.  Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 
269 U.S. 514, 521 (1926) (“the Sixteenth Amendment did not extend the taxing power to any 
new class of subjects”).
47See Section I.C., infra.
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B. The Apportionment Clauses
The Constitution provides that “direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several 
States which may be included in the Union, according to their respective Numbers”48 and that 
“[n]o Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or 
Enumeration herein directed to be taken.”49  These clauses are designed to ensure that the 
citizens of each state pay no more than their proportional share of direct taxes.50
The apportionment clauses were proposed by southern states to prevent the federal 
government from imposing a tax on land or slaves, which would disproportionately burden 
southerners:
The [southern states] possess a large number of slaves; they had 
extensive tracts of territory, thinly settled, and not very productive.  
A majority of the states had but few slaves, and several of them 
limited territory, well settled, and in high state of cultivation.  The 
southern states, if no provision had been introduced in the 
Constitution, would have been wholly at the mercy of the other 
48U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
49U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
50Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 96 (1900); Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176 (Paterson, 
J.) (“each state will be debited for the amount of its quota of the tax, and credited for its 
payment”).
18
states. Congress in such case, might tax slaves, at discretion or 
arbitrarily, and land in every part of the Union at the same rate or 
measure:  so much a head in the first instances, or so much an acre 
in the second.  To guard against imposition in these particulars, 
was the reason for introducing the clause in the Constitution . . . .51
As a result, the Framers insisted that direct taxes be apportioned among the states based 
on population.  Assume Congress, for example, enacts a direct tax, such as a federal property tax, 
to raise $50 million.  For this tax to be constitutional, its burden must be apportioned among the 
50 states based on population.  A sparsely populated state like South Dakota cannot be required 
to pay the same amount (e.g., $1 million) as a densely populated state like California.  Rather, 
the citizens of each state must pay only a proportional amount of the federal tax burden based on 
that state’s population.  
Not long after the Constitutional Convention, it became apparent that compliance with 
the apportionment clauses would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve:   
It appears to me that a tax on carriages cannot be laid by rule of 
apportionment, without very great inequality and injustice.  For 
example:  Suppose two States, equal in census, to pay 80,000 
dollars each, by a tax on carriages, of 8 dollars on every carriage; 
and in one State there are 100 carriages, and in the other 1000.  
The owners of carriages in one State, would pay ten times the tax 
of owners in the other.  A, in one State, would pay for his carriage 
8 dollars, but B, in the other State, would pay for his carriage, 80 
dollars.52
51Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 177.
52See, e.g., Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176 (Chase, J.)
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Compliance with the apportionment clauses, therefore, was a formidable obstacle to direct 
federal taxes, ultimately prompting the 16th Amendment.
1. What Are Direct Taxes?
Originally, “direct taxes” were defined to include only capitation taxes (e.g., poll taxes)53
and taxes on real property imposed solely by reason of ownership by the taxpayer.54  Later, taxes 
on personal property, and taxes on the income from both real and personal property, such as rents 
and interest on bonds, were  held to be direct taxes.55
Direct taxes are levied upon persons and their possession or enjoyment of rights, whereas 
indirect taxes are levied upon events, such as transferring, exchanging, or using property.  
Indirect taxes are not subject to the apportionment clauses.  Examples of direct taxes include 
53Even if a poll tax were to pass muster under the apportionment clauses, it is highly 
unlikely that a poll tax could survive an equal protection challenge.  See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia 
St. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding that Virginia’s poll tax violated the Equal 
Protection Clause).
54Federalist No. 21 (“Those of the direct kind, which principally relate to land and 
buildings, may admit of a rule of apportionment.  Either the value of land, or the number of the 
people, may serve as a standard.”); Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176 (Chase, J.) (direct taxes 
limited to capitations and taxes on land); Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 160, 166 (4th Cir. 
1962).
55Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (invalidating income tax).
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local property taxes, state ad valorem taxes, and, presumably, European-style wealth taxes.56
These taxes are imposed directly on the taxpayer or his or her property; they are not imposed on 
transfers or exchanges of property.
For all practical purposes, there are only two types of direct taxes:  capitation taxes, such 
as poll taxes, and taxes on real and personal property ownership, such as real estate or ad 
valorem taxes.  As a result, the apportionment clauses have little relevance to modern federal 
taxation because there are no federal poll taxes or federal property taxes.57  Instead, the federal 
government raises most, if not all, of its internal revenue via indirect taxes, such as excise taxes, 
death taxes, and income taxes.  The Supreme Court has consistently held that excise and death 
taxes are not direct taxes and, therefore, not subject to the apportionment clauses.58  The law has 
been less certain, however, with regard to income taxes.
Prior to the passage of the 16th Amendment, there was considerable uncertainty over 
whether income taxes were direct or indirect.  As early as 1874, the Supreme Court held that a 
tax upon income was a duty rather than a direct tax, and thus federal income taxes were not 
56Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176 (Chase, J.) (direct taxes limited to capitations and taxes 
on land).
57ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 200 (1997).
58See, e.g., Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 54-55 (upholding 1898 inheritance tax as a valid excise 
tax and not a direct tax).
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required to be apportioned among the states.59  It reaffirmed this conclusion in 1880, when it held 
that a tax levied on personal income, gains, and profits is an excise or duty and not a direct tax.60
From 1880 to 1895, there appeared to be a consensus that income taxes were indirect excise 
taxes not subject to the apportionment clauses.  
In 1895, however, the Supreme Court changed course, holding that taxes on the income 
(e.g., rent) derived from real property was the legal equivalent of a direct tax on the property 
itself and thus must be apportioned.61  As a result, the Court invalidated an income tax on rents 
that was not apportioned among the states.  Later that year, the Court ruled that a tax on income 
derived from personal property was also a direct tax and that the law imposing such tax was 
59Smedberg v. Bentley, 22 F. Cas. 368 (N.J. Cir. 1874) (No. 12,964 ) (“Under the 
constitutional designation of the different kinds of taxation to which resort might be made by 
congress, a tax upon incomes must be classed among the duties authorized, rather than among 
the direct taxes.  No apportionment is necessary when it is laid, and there is nothing to be done 
here but to sustain the demurrer to the first count of the plaintiff’s declaration, and it is ordered 
accordingly.”).  In 1868, the Supreme Court held that a gross receipts tax on the amounts 
insured, renewed, or continued by insurance companies was a duty or excise and not a direct tax.  
Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. 433, 445-46 (1968).  See also Veazie Bank, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 
547 (upholding 10% tax on notes state banks paid to other banks).
60Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880) (income tax is an indirect tax).
61Pollock, 157 U.S. at 639.
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unconstitutional for failure to comply with the apportionment clauses.62  In so doing, the Court 
stated:
The tax imposed by sections twenty-seven to thirty-seven, 
inclusive of the act of 1894, so far as it falls on the income from 
real estate and of personal property, being a direct tax within the 
meaning of the Constitution, and therefore unconstitutional and 
void because not apportioned according to representation. . . .63
Moreover, the Court found that the provisions of the act taxing income derived from real 
and personal property were inseparable from the remainder of the Revenue Act of 1894.  
Consequently, the Court invalidated the entire 1894 federal income tax scheme:
We do not mean to say that an act laying by apportionment a direct 
tax on all real estate and personal property, or the income thereof, 
might not also lay excise taxes on business, privileges, 
employments, and vocations.  But this is not such an act, and the 
scheme must be considered as a whole.  Being invalid as to the 
greater part, and falling, as a tax would, if any part were held valid, 
in a direction which could not have been contemplated except in 
connection with the taxation considered as an entirety, we are 
constrained to conclude that [the Act is] wholly inoperative and 
void.64
The Court thus concluded that a tax on a taxpayer’s entire income, if it included income 
derived from property, is a direct tax and therefore must be apportioned among the states based 
on population.65
62Pollock, 157 U.S. at 637.
63Id.
64Id.
65Id. at 637.
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2. The 16th Amendment
Pollock raised serious doubts about whether income taxes were direct or indirect taxes.66
It also started a debate over whether a federal income tax could be imposed consistent with the 
Constitution.  The 16th Amendment, however, rendered this debate academic.  Ratified in 1913, 
the 16th Amendment provides that “Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on 
income, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and 
without regard to any census or enumeration.”67  The purpose of the 16th Amendment was to 
relieve Congress of the obligation to apportion any tax on classes of income which would require 
apportionment due to its source.68  Under the 16th Amendment, Congress has the power to tax 
income from whatever source derived—labor, real estate, personal property, etc.—without 
66Subsequent decisions have generally held that taxes on income are not direct taxes.  See 
e.g., Richardson v. United States, 294 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1961) (tax on accrued interest of notes 
passing to certain legatees not a direct tax); Jones v. United States, 551 F. Supp. 578 (N.D.N.Y. 
1982) (tax on wages is not a direct tax); Krzyske v. Commissioner, 548 F. Supp 101 (E.D. Mich 
1982) (social security taxes are not direct taxes).
67U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (emphasis added).
68Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 17-19.  
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concern for apportionment.  Thus, the apportionment clauses are no longer a barrier to federal 
income taxes.69
In sum, the apportionment clauses are not a barrier to federal income, death, or excises 
taxes, and these taxes comprise most, if not all, of the federal government’s internal revenue.70
Today, the apportionment clauses would pose a barrier only to a federal property or wealth tax, 
both of which are unlikely to be invoked.
69The apportionment clauses would still inhibit the federal government’s imposition of 
property or wealth taxes.  Of course, “[t]here is no federal property tax.  Imposition of a federal 
property  tax would be politically impractical because the Constitution requires that ‘direct’ taxes 
be proportional to the population of each state.  Thus, if a federal property tax were imposed, 
people living in a state with 50% of the country’s population but only 20% of the country’s 
property value would still be required to pay 50% of the total federal property tax bill.  The 
federal government has levied property taxes twice:  in 1798 and in 1813.  The taxes were 
apportioned among the states as constitutionally required.”  John A. Swain, The Taxation of 
Private Interests in Public Property: Toward a Unified Theory of Property Taxation, 2000 UTAH 
L. REV. 421 n.2.  See also Eric Rakowski, Can Wealth Taxes be Justified, 53 Tax L. Rev. 263, 
269 n.14 (2000) (arguing that a federal wealth tax would be subject to apportionment).
70The Supreme Court has generally assumed that once a tax is found to be outside the 
reach of the apportionment clauses, it is an indirect tax subject to the Uniformity Clause.  
Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 83.
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C. The Uniformity Clause
The Uniformity Clause limits the federal government’s power to impose indirect taxes.71
It  provides: “The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and 
Excises, . . . but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”72
But what does the term “uniform” mean?73
71Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 80.  By contrast, the apportionment clauses limit the federal 
government’s power to impose direct taxes.  See Section I.B., supra.
72U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (emphasis added).  The Uniformity Clause applies only to 
the 50 states and not to Puerto Rico or other U.S. territories.  Downs v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 
287 (1901) (upholding duty on merchandise imported from Puerto Rico).  The Uniformity 
Clause has received little attention from the courts.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has never 
invalidated a tax law on the basis of the Uniformity Clause.  As Professor Bittker aptly states, the 
Uniformity Clause “might have dramatically influenced the structure of the federal income tax, 
but has shriveled away to a mere flyspeck.”  Bittker, supra note 8, at 9. 
73The Framers themselves were uncertain as to the meaning of indirect taxes:: “What is 
the distinction between direct and indirect taxes?  It is a matter of regret that terms so uncertain 
and vague in so important a point are to be found in the Constitution.  We shall seek in vain for 
any antecedent settled legal meaning to the respective terms.  There is none.  We shall be as 
much at a loss to find any disposition of either which can satisfactorily determine the point.”  
Springer, 102 U.S. at 597- 598 (quoting Alexander Hamilton). 
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The Framers of the Constitution furnished little guidance on the meaning of “uniform.”74
The concerns giving rise to the Uniformity Clause, however, provide some insight into its 
purpose.  Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government lacked the power to 
regulate interstate commerce, resulting in interstate trade barriers and regionalism.75  Prior to the 
74Reference to other clauses in the Constitution is also unhelpful.  There are two other 
uniformity clauses in the Constitution:  the Bankruptcy Clause and the Naturalization Clause.  
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.  The Bankruptcy Clause vests in Congress the power to “establish . 
. . uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”  Id.  Unlike the 
narrow construction it has given to the Taxation Uniformity Clause, the Supreme Court in 
Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, held that the Bankruptcy Uniformity Clause 
requires that all similarly situated individuals be treated the same.  455 U.S. 457, 472-73 (1982).  
The Court acknowledge that it construed the two Uniformity Clauses differently, despite the fact 
that they are both contained in Article I, Section 8.  The Court based this distinction, however, on 
the intent of the Framers.  The Naturalization Uniformity Clause was intended, not as an anti-
discrimination provision, but rather as a grant of exclusive power to the federal government over 
immigration matters.  In re Hood, 319 F.3d 755, 763 (6th Cir. 2003).
75JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 46-48 (E. Scott ed. 1898).  
The sole power to regulate commerce was vested in the states.  See ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION, 
art. IV (“the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, 
and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, 
impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such restrictions 
27
Constitution Convention of 1787, Americans were accustomed to putting the interests of their 
respective states or regions over that of the nation.76  In an effort to remedy this situation and 
unify the nation, the Framers of the Constitution vested the power to regulate interstate 
commerce in the federal government.77  Some states remained concerned, however, that the 
shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State, to any other 
State of which the owner is an inhabitant;  provided also that no imposition, duties or restriction 
shall be laid by any State, on the property of the United States, or either of them.”).
76DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 397 (2001).  See also PAUL C. NAGEL, JOHN 
QUINCY ADAMS 50 (1997) (“[T]he Congress of the United States, operating under the severe 
restrictions contained in the Articles of Confederation  . . . seemed unable to cope with the young 
republic’s growth.  This was especially apparent in interstate and foreign commerce.  The 
national economy had become sorely depressed.”).  Not surprisingly, the economic woes of the 
nation led to social unrest, the most notable event being the short-lived Shay’s Rebellion, in 
which a group of debt-ridden farmers banded together and closed courthouses in order to 
forestall creditors.  Robert A. Gross, The Uninvited Guest: Daniel Shays and the Constitution, in
IN DEBT TO SHAYS: THE BICENTENNIAL OF AN AGRARIAN REBELLION 1, 1-2 (Robert A. Gross 
ed., 1993).  
772 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 308 (rev. ed. 
1937); see also, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180 (1992) (“the Framers no doubt 
endowed Congress with the power to regulate interstate commerce in order to avoid further 
instances of the interstate trade disputes that were common under the Articles of Confederation . 
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regionalism that marked the Articles of Confederation would continue.78  These states were 
worried that the federal government would use its power over interstate commerce to favor 
certain states.79  Some of the delegates at the Convention were fearful of conspiracies by large 
. . .”); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (“Under the Articles of 
Confederation, state taxes and duties hindered and suppressed interstate commerce;  the Framers 
intended the Commerce Clause as a cure for these structural ills.”).
78FARRAND, supra note 76, at 308.
79CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 586-587 (1928).  The Clause 
was proposed on August 25 and adopted on August 31 without discussion.  The origins of the 
Uniformity Clause are linked to those of the Port Preference Clause.  The Port Preference Clause 
provides:  “No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the 
Ports of one State over those of another, nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be 
obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.”  ART. I,  § 9, cl. 6.  The purpose of the Port 
Preference Clause is to give small states protection against deliberate discrimination by other, 
more powerful states.  Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1032 n.14 (5th Cir. 1991).  The Port 
Preference Clause does not prohibit legislation that incidentally prefers some ports over others.  
Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1558 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 906 (1991).  
Rather, its purpose is to prevent the federal government from discriminating between states.  
Pennsylvania v. Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421, 435 (1855) (Nelson, J., concurring).  Like the 
Tax Uniformity Clause, the Port Preference Clause is a limit on the federal government, and not 
state governments.  Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135 (1876).  The Port Preference Clause and 
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states or regional combinations.80  According to Justice Story, the Uniformity Clause was 
promulgated to:
cut off all undue preferences of one State over another in the 
regulation of subjects affecting their common interests.  Unless 
duties, imposts, and excises were uniform, the grossest and most 
oppressive inequalities, vitally affecting the pursuits and 
employments of the people of different states, might exist.  The 
agriculture, commerce, or manufactures of one State might be built 
up on the ruins of another; and a combination of a few States in 
Congress might secure a monopoly of certain branches of trade and 
business to themselves, to the injury, if not the destruction, of their 
less favored neighbors.81
The Uniformity Clause, therefore, is designed to ensure that Congress does not impose an 
indirect tax on the citizens of one state different than that imposed on the citizens of another 
state.82
The Uniformity Clause was proposed on August 25, 1787 and adopted by the Framers on 
August 31, 1787 without discussion.83  As adopted, the language provided that all taxes shall be 
the Tax Uniformity Clause were proposed together and reported out of a special committee as an 
interrelated limitation on the national government’s commerce power.  Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 
103-106.  They were separated without explanation when James Madison remedied the omission 
from the Tax Uniformity Clause.  Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 81 n.10.
80FARRAND, supra note 76, at 308.
811 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 957 
(T. Cooley ed. 1873).
82Apache Bend Apartments, 702 F. Supp. at 1296.
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“uniform and equal” throughout the United States.  This clause was proposed by delegates from 
Maryland.84  But when the Committee on Style reported the final draft of the Constitution to the 
Framers, it failed to include the tax uniformity clause.85  Two days later, however, this omission 
was noticed and corrected by James Madison, who handwrote the term “uniform” into Article I, 
Section 8, but omitted the term “equal.”86
1. What is “Uniformity”?
Following the ratification of the Constitution, a debate ensued as to the scope of the 
Uniformity Clause.  Some argued that the Uniformity Clause required intrinsic fairness and 
equality among taxpayers.  According to this view, a federal tax must be levied in precisely the 
same manner and amount upon all individuals.87  A tax that treats two people differently would 
83Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at  81 n.10.
84Luther Martin, Genuine Information, Delivered to the Legislature of the State of 
Maryland (Nov. 12, 1787), in RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 28, at 172, 
205.
85Id.
86CHARLES ADAMS, FOR GOOD AND EVIL: THE IMPACT OF TAXES ON THE COURSE OF 
CIVILIZATION 307 (1993).
87Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 84.
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not, accordingly, be uniform.  This view found support in Hylton v. United States,88 a case in 
which the Supreme Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of a federal tax on 
carriages.  In that case, Justice Paterson stated:  “Uniformity is an instant operation on 
individuals, without regard to the intervention of assessments, or any regard to states. . . .”89
Similarly, Justice Iredell, voting to uphold the carriage tax, opined “the tax ought to be uniform, 
because the present Constitution was particularly intended to affect individuals, and not states. . . 
.”
90
A few years later, the Supreme Court, upholding a federal excise tax on distillers, again 
lent support to the argument that the Uniformity Clause required equality among taxpayers:
The law is not in our judgment subject to any constitutional 
objection.  The tax imposed upon distillers is in the nature of an 
excise, and the only limitation upon the power of Congress in the 
imposition of taxes of this character is that they shall be “uniform 
throughout the United States.”  The tax here is uniform in its 
operation; that is, it is assessed equally upon all manufacturers of 
spirits, wherever they are.  The law does not establish one rule for 
one distiller and a different rule or another, but the same rule for all 
alike.91
The view that the Uniformity Clause required intrinsic fairness and equality was short-
lived.  By the late 19th Century, the Supreme Court declared once and for all that the Uniformity 
883 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
89Id. at 181.
90Id. at 181.
91United States v. Singer, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 111, 121 (1872).
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Clause simply requires geographic uniformity.  That is, an indirect tax “is uniform when it 
operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found.”92  There 
is no requirement that the tax apply equally to all taxpayers.  This view was first pronounced in 
the Head Money Cases,93 in which the Supreme Court upheld a federal head tax on persons 
immigrating through port cities such as New York.  Challengers of the head tax had argued that 
it was not uniform because it applied to persons immigrating at port cities but not to those 
immigrating at inland cities.  The Court, however, sustained the tax, concluding that because the 
tax applies to all port cities alike, “there is substantial uniformity within the meaning and purpose 
of the Constitution.”94
“Subsequent cases have confirmed that the Framers did not intend to restrict Congress’s 
ability to define the class of objects to be taxed.  They intended only that the tax apply wherever 
the classification is found.”95  Thus, Congress may distinguish between similar classes in 
selecting the subject of a tax.  For example, in Knowlton v. Moore,96 the Supreme Court upheld a 
federal inheritance tax despite the fact that the law imposed a progressive tax on legacies and 
92Head Money Cases (Edye v. Robertson), 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884).
93112 U.S. 580 (1884).
94Id. at 595.
95See, e.g., Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 82.
96178 U.S. 41 (1900).
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varied the rate of tax among classes of legatees.  In so doing, the Court reaffirmed that the 
Uniformity Clause simply requires geographic uniformity and not intrinsic equality.  
The Knowlton court gave three reasons for rejecting an intrinsic equality interpretation of 
the Uniformity Clause.  First, if the Framers had intended something more than geographic 
uniformity, there would have been no reason to add the phrase “throughout the United States” in 
Article I, Section 8.  That phrase clearly denotes a geographic limitation and would be redundant 
if the Uniformity Clause required intrinsic equality among individual taxpayers.97  To interpret 
that phrase otherwise would “lead to a disregard of the elementary canon of construction which 
requires that effect be given to each word of the Constitution.”98  Second, the Framers imposed 
two limits on Congress’s power to tax:  direct taxes must be apportioned among the states based 
on population and indirect taxes must be uniform throughout the United States.  The purpose of 
the apportionment clauses is to protect individual taxpayers from paying disproportionate shares 
of federal taxes.  The apportionment clauses, therefore, impose a form of intrinsic equality.  But 
this intrinsic equality applies only to direct taxes.  If the Framers had intended to extend this 
intrinsic equality to indirect taxes, they would not have distinguished the two taxes.99  Thus, for 
97Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 87.
98Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 87.
99Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 89 (“Now, that the requirement that direct taxes should be 
apportioned among the several states, contemplated the protection of the States, to prevent their 
being called upon to contribute more than was deemed their due share of the burden, is clear.”).
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indirect taxes, the Framers must have intended only geographic uniformity.100  Third, the 
experience in England and the American states and colonies provided no evidence that indirect 
taxes must be imposed in an intrinsically equal manner.  To the contrary, the experience in those 
jurisdictions, and the records of the Continental Congress and Constitution Convention of 
1787,101 made clear that the Uniformity Clause mandates nothing more than geographic 
uniformity.102
Ever since Knowlton, it has been clear that “the uniformity in excise taxes enacted by the 
Constitution is geographic uniformity, not uniformity of intrinsic equality and operation. . . .  The 
Constitution does not command that a tax have an equal effect in each State.”103  Rather, 
geographic uniformity simply precludes the federal government from imposing “a different tax 
100Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 87-89.
101Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 101 (“[N]ot a single word is found in any of the debates . . . 
which gives the slightest intimation that any suggestion was even made that the grant of power to 
[impose an indirect] tax was considered from the point of view of its operation on the 
individual.”)
102Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 89-106.  “By the result of an analysis of the history of the 
adoption of the Constitution it becomes plain that the words ‘uniform throughout the United 
States’ do not signify an intrinsic, but simply a geographical, uniformity.”  Id. at 106.
103Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 359 (1945) (upholding federal estate tax).
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in one state or states than was levied in another state or states.”104  A “tax is uniform when it 
operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found.”105  Thus, 
a tax law may not be “drawn on state political lines.”106
There is no lack of uniformity, however, simply because the subject of the tax is not 
found in some states107 or because “[d]ifferences in state law . . . may bring a person within or 
without a category designated by Congress as taxable . . . .”108  An indirect tax may affect 
citizens of different states differently, as long as the purpose of the tax is not to favor the citizens 
of one state over the citizens of another state.109  The Uniformity Clause does not require a tax to 
be intrinsically uniform; that is, it is not necessary that the tax operate upon one individual in 
104Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 12. 
105Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 594.
106Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 78.
107Fernandez, 326 U.S. at 359.
108Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 117 (1930) (“differences of state law, which may bring 
a person within or without the category designated by Congress as taxable, may not be read into 
the Revenue Act to spell out a lack of uniformity”); Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 17-18 (1927) 
(federal estate tax credit for state inheritance taxes paid is uniform despite the fact that Florida 
does not have an inheritance tax). 
109Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 85-86.
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precisely the same manner as on all individuals.110  Indeed, indirect taxes will necessarily affect 
taxpayers in different states differently since states naturally will have different quantities on the 
subject being taxed.111  “Perfect uniformity and perfect equality of taxation . . . is a baseless 
dream. . . .”112  Accordingly, a tax law is uniform if the same rates apply generally throughout 
the United States.113
110Chiles v. United States, 61 A.F.T.R.2d 81-1378 (D. Or. 1986).
111Apache Bend Apartments, 702 F. Supp. at 1296.  “This created the possibility of most 
of the revenue from the tax on this activity coming from a few states where the activity is widely 
conducted, and very little revenue from those states where the activity is relatively unimportant.”  
Chiles, 61 A.F.T.R.2d at 88-1378.  Congress is not even prohibited from using geographic terms 
to define a class of objects to be taxed.  Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 84 (taxation of “Alaskan oil” 
upheld where tax applied, at the very same rate, in all portions of the United States where the 
subject of the tax is found).
112Head Money Case, 112 U.S. at 595 (citation omitted) (“Is a tax on tobacco void, 
because in many of the States no tobacco is raised or manufactured?  Is the tax on distilled spirits 
void, because a few states pay three-fourths of the revenue arising from it?”).
113Heitsch v. Kavanagh, 200 F.3d 178, 180 (6th Cir. 1952) (upholding estate tax despite 
the fact that some taxpayers settle with the government for less than the full rate); R.C. Tway 
Coal Co. v. Glenn, 12 F. Supp. 570, 595 (W.D. Ky. 1935) (1 ½ percent tax per ton of coal is a 
uniform tax).
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2. What Are Indirect Taxes?
The Uniformity Clause identifies three categories of indirect taxes: duties, imposts, and 
excises.114 For all practical purposes, however, the Uniformity Clause applies to any tax that is 
not a direct tax
The terms duties, imposts and excises are generally treated as 
embracing the indirect forms of taxation contemplated by the 
Constitution. Therefore, if a tax is not a direct tax, it falls within 
the general category of indirect taxes, and it is a matter of no 
moment whether its classification be further refined as a duty, or 
an impost, or an excise.115
Whether a tax is direct or indirect depends upon what is being taxed.116  “Direct taxes 
bear immediately upon persons, upon the possession and enjoyment of rights; indirect taxes are 
levied upon the happening of an event or an exchange.”117  For example, a tax imposed upon a 
114U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
115Penn Mut. Indem., 32 T.C. at 660-61.
116Alexander Hamilton, Defence of the Funding System, July 1795, in 19 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 22, 25 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1973) (“In all but direct taxes the 
Constitution requires uniformity.”).
117Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 47.
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particular use of property incidental to ownership is an excise tax.118  An excise taxis is “an 
indirect tax, one not directly imposed upon persons or property, and is one that is imposed on the 
performance of an act, the engaging in any occupation, or the enjoyment o[f] a privilege.”119
Another example of an indirect tax is the federal estate and gift tax, which is imposed on 
the transfer of property and not the property itself:
Although different modes of assessing such duties prevail, and 
although they have different accidental names, such as probate 
duties, stamp duties, . . . estate taxes, or privilege taxes, 
nevertheless tax laws of this  nature in all countries rest in their 
essence upon the principle that death is the generating source from 
which the particular taxing power takes its being, and that it is the 
power to transmit, or the transmission from the dead to the living, 
on which such taxes are more immediately rested.120
118Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929) (estate tax, which included within 
gross estate transfers made in contemplation of death, is an indirect tax not subject to 
apportionment).
119In re Tri-Manufacturing & Sales Co., 82 B.R. 58, 60 (Bankr. S. D. Ohio 1988).
120Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 56.  See also Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 502-03 
(1930).
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Income taxes121 and corporate taxes122 are also indirect taxes because they are imposed 
on the earning of money and not directly on individuals or property.123  The list of taxes found to 
be indirect by the Supreme Court is extensive:
a ‘license’ or ‘special’ tax upon dealers in certain commodities 
(License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462; cf. South Carolina v. United 
States, 199 U.S. 437); a tax on sales at commodity exchanges 
(Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509); a tax on the transfer or sale of 
securities (Treat v. White, 181 U.S. 264; Thomas v. United States, 
192 U.S. 363; Provost v. United States, 269 U.S. 443); a tax on the 
issuance of State bank notes (Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533); 
a tax on manufactured tobacco having reference to its origin and 
intended use (Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608); a tax on the 
manufacture and sale of oleomargarine (McCray v. United States, 
195 U.S. 27); a tax on devolutions of title to real estate (Scholey v. 
Rew, 23 Wall. 331); a tax on the receipt of legacies (Knowlton v. 
Moore, 178 U.S. 41); a tax on transfers at death (New York Trust 
Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345); a tax on transfers inter vivos 
(Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124).  
121Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 15; Apache Bend Apartments, 702 F. Supp. at 1295) (1986 Tax 
Reform Act that granted temporary exemptions to certain taxpayers does not violate Uniformity 
Clause).
122Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 151-52 (1911) (upholding corporate income 
tax).
123See generally, C. Johnson, The Illegitimate “Earned” Requirement in Tax and Nontax 
Accounting, 50 Tax. L. Rev. 373, 412 (1995) (“viewed as a tax on earnings, the income tax is  an 
indirect tax”). 
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Indeed, in response to the contention in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, that the estate tax was a 
direct tax, the Supreme Court swept away all logical arguments with Justice Holmes’s infamous 
statement:  “Upon this point a page of  history is worth a volume of logic.”124  The category of 
indirect taxes, therefore, is “wide and comprehensive . . . in striking contrast to the very narrow 
range within which ‘direct’ taxes have been limited. . . .”125
3. The 16th Amendment
The 16th Amendment had no effect on the Uniformity Clause,126 so federal income tax 
laws are still required to be “uniform throughout the United States.”127  This, of course, calls into 
question the necessity of the 16th Amendment.  The federal government had the power to tax 
124256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (holding that federal estate tax is an indirect tax).
125Penn Mut. Indem., 32 T.C. at 661.  Direct Taxes are not, as Woodrow Wilson 
proclaimed in 1885, favored in America:  “All direct taxes are heartily disliked. . . .”  WOODROW 
WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 100 (1981)  
126The 16th Amendment says nothing about uniformity:  “Congress shall have the power 
to lay and collect taxes on income, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among 
the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”  U.S. CONST.  amend. XVI.
127Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 24 (federal income tax subject to Uniformity Clause after 16th 
Amendment).
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income prior to the 16th Amendment.128  The sole purpose of the 16th Amendment was to 
relieve Congress of the obligation to apportion income taxes.129  But only direct taxes are subject 
to apportionment.  There is no dispute today—and arguably no dispute prior to the ratification of 
the 16th Amendment—that income taxes are indirect taxes and, as such, are not subject to the 
apportionment clauses.130  As a consequence, the 16th Amendment served no real purpose.
II. Circuit-Specific Application of the Internal Revenue Code
In recent years, the IRS has instituted an official practice of applying various parts of the 
Internal Revenue Code in only some states.  This occurs when the IRS disagrees with a federal 
circuit court’s interpretation of the Code.  In such cases, the IRS issues a formal opinion stating 
that it will adhere to the circuit court’s interpretation of the tax law in states in that circuit, but 
not in other states.  As a result, different tax laws are being applied in different states in direct 
contravention of the spirit, if not the letter, of the Uniformity Clause.
128Flint, 220 U.S. at 151-52.  “Among the numerous indirect taxes imposed by Congress 
under article I, section 8, of the Constitution were the various income taxes levied for a period of 
nearly 10 years at about the time of the Civil War.”  Penn Mut. Indem., 32 T.C. at 662.
129Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 17-19.  
130Flint, 220 U.S. at 150-151 (holding that a corporate income tax was an indirect tax and 
thus not subject to the apportionment clauses).
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Three examples of the IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax law should suffice.  In 
a Field Service Advisory dated August 7, 1992,131 the IRS was asked to opine on whether a 
taxpayer is entitled to interest, for the period when the taxpayer’s refund checks were initially 
issued until the time when they were reissued, on checks that were mailed to the wrong address.  
The IRS declared that the taxpayer was not entitled to interest.  The IRS made clear, however, 
that the outcome would have been different had the taxpayer resided in New York, Connecticut, 
or Vermont.132  Why the geographical distinction?  In 1990, the Second Circuit had ruled in 
Doolin v. United States,133 that a similarly situated taxpayer was entitled to interest.  The IRS, 
though, refused to apply Doolin outside the Second Circuit:  “The Service does not intend to 
follow the decision in any circuit, except the Second Circuit.”134  By so doing, the IRS is 
1311992 WL 1355759 (Aug. 7).
132The Second Circuit is comprised of New York, Connecticut, and Vermont.
133918 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Under all the circumstances, we cannot agree that there 
was a proper tender of  the March 1986 check to plaintiffs;  that check was therefore not a 
“refund check” within the meaning of § 26 U.S.C.  6611(b)(2).   Accordingly, the first check that 
was properly tendered was the March 1990 check, and plaintiffs are entitled to appropriate 
interest for the period between March 18, 1986 and a date within 30 days of March 9, 1990, the 
date of the ‘refund check.’”).
1341992 WL 1355759 (Aug. 7).
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applying federal tax law differently in some states than it is in others.  As a result, residents of 
New York are entitled to interest but residents of California are not.
Second, in A.O.D. 1994-004,135 the IRS issued a nonacquiescence in response to a 
decision of the Eighth Circuit involving the correction of a prohibited transfer under § 4975.136
The Eighth Circuit had held that corrections under § 4975(f)(5) are automatic and thus no 
additional tax was owed by the taxpayers.137  The IRS disagreed, opining that the taxpayers had 
failed to take the proper actions to correct a prohibited sale or exchange under § 4975(c)(1)(a) 
135A.O.D. 1994-004, 1994 WL 805237 (May 31).
136I.R.C. § 4975 imposes additional taxes on certain prohibited transfers from qualified 
pension plans.
137Zabolotny v. Commissioner, 7 F.3d 774, 778 n.3 (8th Cir. 1993) (“The IRS also asserts 
that, because § 4975(a) imposes a blanket prohibition on certain types of transaction regardless 
of the transaction’s financial success and demands a 5% of the value of the transaction from the 
disqualified person involved whether or not the transaction turned out to be a ‘good deal,’ the 
same standards should apply to § 4975(b).   We disagree.   Congress created a two-tier, not a 
one-tier, tax liability scheme, and one of the distinguishing features of the second-tier tax is that 
instead of being imposed automatically it is avoidable through correction.  The mandatory nature 
of the first-tier excise tax simply does not require us to hold that the financial consequences of 
the transaction to the plan are irrelevant for the purposes determining the propriety of a second-
tier excise tax liability.”) (citations omitted).
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and thus a 100% tax was due under § 4975(b).138  Despite the fact that no other circuit courts had 
ruled on this issue, the IRS declared that it would continue to apply § 4975(f)(5) in a manner 
inconsistent with the Eighth Circuit’s opinion, but only for taxpayers living outside the Eighth 
Circuit.139  Thus, taxpayers residing in, say, Arkansas,140 are treated differently than those 
residing in, say, Colorado.  
Third, in Revenue Ruling 72-583,141 the IRS declared two rules for gifts to political 
campaigns.  If the taxpayer resides, say, in Virginia or any other state outside the Fifth Circuit,142
gifts to political campaigns are considered taxable gifts under the federal gift tax.  For taxpayers 
residing in Texas or any other state within the Fifth Circuit, such gifts are not taxable.  Why?  
Because the Fifth Circuit had so held.143
138AOD 1994-004, 1994 WL 805237 (May 31).
139A.O.D. 1994-004, 1994 WL 805237 (May 31).
140The Eighth Circuit is comprised of Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, and South Dakota.
1411972-2 C.B. 534.  Revenue Ruling 1972-2 was subsequently superceded by statute.  
See I.R.C. § 2501(e).
142The Fifth Circuit is comprised of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.
143United States v. Stern, 436 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1971) (“The transactions in controversy 
were permeated with commercial and economic factors.  The contributions were motivated by 
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In all three examples, the IRS is applying one tax law in some states and another tax law 
other states.  And the IRS’s distinction is based solely on geography, as the federal circuits are 
drawn on state political boundaries.  The IRS’s distinction is not based on state law or the 
taxpayers themselves.  This is nothing more, therefore, than a non-uniform application of the tax 
law by the federal government.
III. Application of the Uniformity Clause to the IRS
“The Uniformity Clause requires that an excise tax apply, at the same rate, in all portions 
of the United States where the subject of the tax is found.”144  If Congress passed a law that 
applied different taxes to different circuits, the law would undoubtedly violate the Uniformity 
Clause.  The IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax laws, therefore, clearly violates the 
appellee’s desire to promote a slate of candidates that would protect and advance her personal 
and property interests.  To assure that the funds would be spent in a manner consonant with the 
attainment of that goal, appellee and her group retained control over the disbursement of their 
contributions.  In a very real sense, then, Mrs. Stern was making an economic investment that 
she believed would have a direct and favorable effect upon her property holdings and business 
interests in New Orleans and Louisiana.  These factors, in conjunction with the undisputed 
findings of the lower court that the expenditures were bona fide, at arms length and free from 
donative intent, lead us, in light of what we have said above, to the conclusion that the 
expenditures satisfy the spirit of the Regulations and are to be considered as made for an 
adequate and full consideration.”).
144Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 84 (emphasis added).
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spirit of the Uniformity Clause, as the IRS is applying different tax laws to different states.145
But does the IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax law violate the letter of the Uniformity 
Clause?
The Uniformity Clause is contained in Article I of the Constitution.146  By its terms, 
therefore, it does not limit the actions of the IRS; it applies only to Congress.147  As a 
consequence, it is arguable that only Congress, and not the IRS, can violate the Uniformity 
Clause.  Such an argument, however, would render the Uniformity Clause meaningless.
There are two ways of viewing the IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax law.  First, 
it could be argued that the Uniformity Clause applies only to the legislative process, and the IRS 
is not making law, but simply choosing not to enforce an otherwise uniform law in some states.  
The problem with this argument is that the “power to alter or repeal laws is a legislative power 
and executive officers may not by means of construction, rules and regulations, orders or 
otherwise, extend, alter, repeal, set at naught or disregard laws enacted by the legislature.”148
145The federal circuits follow state political boundaries.  The Seventh Circuit, for 
instance, includes Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin.
146U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
147As part of the executive branch, the IRS is governed by Article II of the Constitution.
148Peony Park, 121 F. Supp. at 695.  Congress, not the Internal Revenue Service, is the 
appropriate body to consider substantive changes to the tax laws.  Investment Annuity, Inc. v. 
Blumenthal, 442 F. Supp. 681, 693 (D.D.C. 1997).  See also Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 
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This is particular true in the area of tax law, where courts have held that it is unlawful for the IRS 
to adopt different enforcement policies for different circuits:  “The letter of the Commissioner 
[setting forth a different enforcement policy for the Eighth Circuit] could not have the effect of 
changing the law.  Insofar as the Commissioner adopted an enforcement policy contrary to the 
statute, the enforcement policy was unlawful.”149
Alternatively, it could be argued that the IRS is involved in the legislative process by 
virtue of the fact that Congress has delegated its power to make tax law to the IRS.150  It is well 
settled that the executive branch lacks the independent power to impose taxation; only Congress 
has that authority.151  Accordingly, any power the IRS has to impose tax law must have been 
1441 (9th Cir. 1983) (Pregerson, J., concurring) (agency’s refusal to adhere to circuit court’s 
decision is “akin to the repudiated pre-Civil War doctrine of nullification”); Stieberger v. 
Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (nonacquiescence renders “[t]he judiciary’s 
duty and authority . . . to say what the law is . . . a virtual nullity”).
149Peony Park, 121 F. Supp. at 695.
150Congress’s delegation powers are virtually unlimited.  See, e.g., Whitman v. American 
Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001).
151Inland Prods. Co. v. Blair, 31 F.2d 867, 868 (4th Cir. 1929) (“The Revenue Acts in 
force in 1918 and 1919 did not impose the soft drink tax upon sweet cider, and the regulations of 
the Revenue Department attempting to impose it were void.”); Investment Annuity, 442 F. Supp. 
at 693; Peony Park, 121 F. Supp. at 695.
48
delegated to it by Congress.152 When Congress delegates powers to the executive branch, 
however, the executive branch assumes those powers subject to the same constitutional 
restrictions that limited Congress’s power.153  For example, the First Amendment provides that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. . . .”154  By its terms, only 
Congress, and not the executive branch, is subject to the First Amendment.  If applied literally, 
the executive branch could promulgate regulations that abridge free speech with impunity.  Such 
a construction would, of course, render the First Amendment meaningless, and courts have so 
held:
Petitioner argues that the [FCC’s] regulations  . . . violate the First 
Amendment.  The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”  Although the text of 
the First Amendment refers to legislative enactments by Congress, 
it is actually much broader in scope and encompasses, among other 
things, regulations promulgated by administrative agencies.155
152Congress has the authority to delegate its Article I, § 8 powers to the executive branch.  
California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 59 (1974); District of Columbia v. Thompson 
Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109 (1953) (Congress may delegate its legislate power “subject of course to 
constitutional limitations to which all lawmaking is subservient.”).
153See, e.g., U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
154U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
155U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1232 (First Amendment prohibits FCC from requiring 
telecommunications company to obtain affirmative approval from customers before company 
could use that customer’s proprietary network information for marketing purposes).
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The same holds true for restrictions on Congress contained in Article I on the Constitution:  
“Congress may delegate [under Article I, § 8, cl. 17 its] . . . full legislative power, subject of 
course to constitutional limitations to which all lawmaking is subservient . . . .”156  Obviously, 
Congress cannot delegate more power than it has:  “[O]ur operating premise must be that an 
agency, or as here, an executive office with delegated power to promulgate rules, cannot have 
greater power to regulate . . . conduct than does Congress.”157  Otherwise, Congress could easily 
avoid constitutional restrictions like the Uniformity Clause by simply delegating authority to the 
executive branch.  Accordingly, if the IRS is imposing tax law— rather than enforcing tax law—
it must do so in compliance with the Uniformity Clause.158
In summary, when the IRS applies tax law in a circuit-specific manner, it is either 
unlawfully refusing to enforce a tax statute in certain states or imposing a non-uniform tax law in 
violation of the Uniformity Clause.  In either case, the IRS’s actions are unconstitutional.
156Thompson, 346 U.S. at 109.
157Neinast v. Texas, 217 F.3d 275, 281 (5th Cir. 2000). 
158See generally, Margaret L. Thum, Confusion in the Courts: The Failure to Tax 
Punitive Damages Uniformly in Personal Injury Cases, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 591 (1996) 
(arguing that inconsistent circuit court decisions violate the Uniformity Clause); Gary L. 
Rodgers, The Commissioner “Does Not Acquiesce,” 59 NEB. L. REV. 1001, 1009 (1980) 
(suggesting that inconsistent interpretation of tax laws by courts could violate Uniformity 
Clause).
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IV. Proposal
The IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax law violates the spirit, if not the letter, of 
the Uniformity Clause.  The IRS, however, is not totally to blame.  The real culprit is a judicial 
system in which thirteen different circuit courts independently interpret federal tax law.159  When 
the IRS disagrees with a circuit court’s interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, the IRS has 
three unappealing choices.  It can apply the tax law in accordance with the circuit court’s 
interpretation in that circuit, but not in other circuits.  This is the IRS’s current practice, which 
arguably violates the Uniformity Clause.160  Alternatively, the IRS could apply the tax law in 
accordance with the circuit court’s interpretation in all circuits.  Under this approach, each circuit 
court would effectively speak for the entire nation, raising the circuit court’s prominence to that 
of the United States Supreme Court.  This approach is not followed in other areas of federal 
159ROSWELL MAGILL, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXES 209 (1943) (“If we were seeking 
to secure a state of complete uncertainty in tax jurisprudence, we would hardly do better than to 
provide for 87 Courts [as of 1943] with original jurisdiction, 11 appellate bodies [now 13] of 
coordinate rank, and only a discretionary review of relatively few cases by the Supreme Court.”).  
Appeals from district courts are heard by the circuit court in which that district is located.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 1294.  Appeals from the Tax Court are heard by the circuit court in which the taxpayer 
resides.  See 26 U.S.C. § 7482.  Appeals from the Court of Federal Claims are heard by the 
Federal Circuit.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1295.  In all, 13 different circuit courts hear tax appeals.
160See Section II, supra.
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law,161 and, of course, is not feasible where there are contradictory circuit court 
interpretations.162  Finally, the IRS could, theoretically, ignore the circuit court’s interpretation 
altogether.163  But this alternative violates one of the first principles of judicial review: a federal 
161See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996) (invalidating affirmative 
action programs in 5th Circuit only), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
162If there were a split in the circuits, the IRS, under this alternative, would have no 
choice but to apply different laws in different states.  Circuit splits are not uncommon in tax law.  
For example, the circuits are split on whether a contingent fee is a part of the client’s taxable 
income.  Compare Foster v. United States, 249 F.3d 1275, 1279-80 (11th Cir.2001);  Srivastava 
v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 353, 364-65 (5th Cir.2000); Davis v. Commissioner, 210 F.3d 1346 
(11th Cir.2000) (per curiam);  Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir.2000); 
Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119, 125-26 (5th Cir.1959), with Young v. Commissioner, 
240 F.3d 369, 376-79 (4th Cir.2001); Coady v. Commissioner, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir.2000), 
and Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1454-55 (Fed. Cir.1995).
163This practice has been condemned by courts.  See, e.g., Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1441 
(Pregerson, J., concurring) (agency’s refusal to adhere to circuit court’s decision is “akin to the 
repudiated pre-Civil War doctrine of nullification”); Stieberger, 615 F. Supp. at 1357 
(nonacquiescence doctrine renders “[t]he judiciary’s duty and authority . . . to say what the law is 
. . . a virtual nullity”).
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court’s interpretation of federal law is final and controlling.164  Accordingly, any proposal to 
reform the IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax law must start with a change in the 
appellate process.
The simplest and best solution would be to require all federal tax appeals to be heard in a 
single forum.  This Article, therefore, proposes that Congress amend 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) by 
adding a provision granting exclusive jurisdiction of federal tax appeals to the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit.165  The Federal Circuit was created to provide “a forum for appeals from 
throughout the country in areas of the law where Congress determines that there is special need 
164Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“the federal judiciary is supreme in the 
exposition of the law”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (“It is emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
165Such an amendment could read:  “(a) The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction--
   *  *  *
(15) of appeals from a final decision of the United States Court of 
Federal Claims, the United States Tax Court, or a United States 
District Court involving claims under Title 26 (the Internal 
Revenue Code).
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for . . . uniformity.”166  For example, in an effort to unify and stabilize the law of patents, 
Congress assigned jurisdiction over virtually all federal patent appeals to the Federal Circuit.167
This exclusive jurisdiction, many argue, has added a needed stability and unity to the law of 
166S. Rep. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 
1982, pp. 13 (Nov. 18, 1981).  “[T]here are areas of the law in which the appellate courts reach 
inconsistent decisions on the same issue, or in which—although the rule of law may be fairly 
clear—courts apply the law unevenly when faced with the facts of individual cases.”  Id. at 13.  
The Federal Circuit was designed  to provide “a prompt, definitive answer to legal questions” in 
these areas. Id. at 11.
167Id. at 11, 12-17.  According to 28 U.S.C. § 1295, “[t]he United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a decision of (A) 
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
with respect to patent applications and interferences, at the instance of an applicant for a patent 
or any party to a patent interference, and any such appeal shall waive the right of such applicant 
or  party to proceed under section 145 or 146 of title 35; (B) the Under Secretary of Commerce 
for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office or the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board with respect to applications for registration of marks and 
other proceedings as provided in section 21 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1071); or 
(C) a district court to which a case was directed pursuant to section 145, 146, or 154(b) of title 
35.”
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patents.168  There is no reason the Federal Circuit could not do the same for tax law.169
Uniformity is needed in tax law ever bit as much as patent law:  “[U]niformity among the 
168See e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing 
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 754 (2001); Howard T. Markey, The Federal Circuit and 
Congressional Intent, 41 Am. U. L. Rev. 577, 577 (1992) (discussing the Federal Circuit’s 
success in fulfilling Congress’s desire to create uniformity in patent law); Allan M. Soobert, 
Breaking New Grounds in Administrative Revocation of U.S. Patents: A Proposition for 
Opposition—And Beyond, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 63, 104 (1998) (“The 
Federal Circuit has, for the most part, been successful in achieving its primary goal of providing 
uniformity in patent law.”); Harry F. Manbeck, Jr., The Federal Circuit- First Ten Years of 
Patentability Decisions, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 499, 504 (1992) (Commissioner of Patents and 
Trademarks opining that “[t]he first ten  years of Federal Circuit jurisprudence has restored 
efficiency and reliability to the patent law”).
169See generally Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, Final Report 73 (Dec. 18, 1998), available at http://app.comm. 
uscourts.gov/final/appstruc.pdf  (suggesting that a specialized court of tax appeals is unnecessary 
and that tax appeals should be centralized in the Federal Circuit).  Alternatively, Congress could 
create a new appellate court to hear all tax appeals. Various tax jurists, practitioners, and 
academics have proposed the creation of a court of tax appeals.  None of these proposals, 
however, was prompted by the IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax law.  See, e.g., H. 
Todd Miller, A Court of Tax Appeals Revisited, 85 YALE L.J. 228 (1975); Oscar E. Bland, 
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circuits is particularly desirable in tax cases to ensure equal application of the tax system to our 
citizenry.”170  Indeed, as this Article illustrates, uniformity of tax law is not only desirable, it is 
constitutionally prescribed.
Congress has nearly unlimited authority to modify or expand the appellate jurisdiction of 
federal courts; thus, the proposed amendment would be constitutional.171 Moreover, the Federal 
Circuit’s interpretation of the tax law would be final and binding on the IRS, subject only to 
Federal Tax Appeals, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 1013 (1925); MAGILL, supra note 158, at 209; Roger 
J. Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income, Estate and Gift Taxes—A 
Criticism and a Proposal, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1393 (1938); Charles L.B. Lowndes, Taxation and 
the Supreme Court, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 165 (1938); Erwin N. Griswold, The Need for a Court of 
Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1944); Gary W. Carter, The Commissioner’s 
Nonacquiescence: A Case for a National Court of Tax Appeals, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 879 (1986).
170Washington Energy Co. v. United States, 94 F.3d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting  
Gibraltar Fin. Corp. v. United States, 825 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir.1987)); First Charter Fin. 
Corp. v. United States, 669 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1982); Keasler v. United States, 766 F.2d 
1227, 1233 (8th Cir. 1985).
171See, e.g., Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868) (upholding statute removing 
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions); but see United States v. 
Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871) (suggesting that Congress’s power over the court’s appellate 
jurisdiction is not unlimited).  
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review by the United States Supreme Court or, in some instances, a Congressional amendment to 
the tax law.
This proposal offers several advantages to the current state of the law.  Appeals from 
final decisions of the district courts, the Court of Federal Claims, and the Tax Court would be 
heard by a single circuit court.172  This would eliminate inconsistent circuit court decisions, as all 
tax appeals would be decided by the Federal Circuit.173  In the event of inconsistent decisions by 
different panels of the Federal Circuit, the Federal Circuit could resolve such inconsistencies en 
banc.174  The Tax Court has adhered to such a policy for years.175
172Under current law, the Federal Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over tax cases arising 
out of the Court of Federal Claims.  See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295 (“The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final 
decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims”). 
173Appeals would continue to be as a matter of right.  See e.g., McDonald v. United 
States, 13 Cl. Ct. 255, 265 n.3 (1987) (parties have a “right to appeal to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit”).  Thus, the IRS could appeal any trial court decision with 
which it disagrees.  This would prevent the trial courts from becoming the new bastion of non-
uniformity.
174FED. CIR. R. 35 (“A majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service 
may order that an appeal or other proceeding be heard or reheard by the court of appeals en banc. 
An en banc hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless: (1) en 
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Because the Federal Circuit’s decision would be final, binding, and not subject to 
inconsistent circuit court interpretations, non-acquiescence would not be an option for the IRS.  
Under the proposal, the IRS must apply the tax law as interpreted by the Federal Circuit until 
such time as the Federal Circuit’s interpretation is modified or overruled by the Supreme Court 
or the tax law is amended by Congress.176  As a result, the IRS would no longer have any reason 
to apply the tax law in a circuit-specific manner because there will be only one circuit court 
interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, thereby eliminating any Uniformity Clause 
problems.
banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions; or (2) 
the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.”).  The Federal Circuit also has 
the power to stay enforcement, pending appeal, of any trial court decision.  FED. CIR. R. 8.
175In the Tax Court, every proposed decision of a trial judge must be referred to the chief 
judge before release to assure consistency with the court’s existing position. The chief judge may 
refer the case to the full Tax Court for possible change. I.R.C. § 7460.
176See generally, The First Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 100 F.R.D. 499 (1983) (“A single court of tax appeals, insulated 
as a practical matter from any but the rarest Supreme Court review, but always subject to 
correction through the legislative process, inevitably would promote uniformity and coherence. 
Things would not always be settled “right,” as losing litigants and the similarly situated will 
assert with fervor, but subject to congressional review they will be settled.  That seems to me 
worth a great deal.”).  
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Fourth, if the Federal Circuit hears all tax appeals, that court can develop an expertise in 
tax matters, as it has in patent cases:  “Clearly, the Federal Circuit has developed patent expertise 
of a higher average level than that previously found in the regional circuits, as a result of 
deciding over 200 patent appeals per year.  The fact that the Federal Circuit has a principal 
responsibility for the patent system, rather than for deciding the odd case, contributes to the 
development of that expertise.”177  The same should hold true for tax appeals.178  Tax law is 
every bit as intricate and incoherent as patent law, particularly to generalized judges who rarely 
177J. Pegram, Should There be a U.S. Trial Court with a Specialization in Patent 
Litigation,  82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 766, 788 (2000).  See also Warner-Jenkinson 
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997); Micro Motion, Inc. v. Exac Corp., 741 
F. Supp. 1426, 1434 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (noting the special expertise of the Federal Circuit in 
patent cases).
178First Annual Judicial Conference, supra note 175, at  499 (“A court of tax appeals 
would be a specialist’s tribunal.  Sensibly, I think, it would be a tax specialist tribunal, its 
jurisdiction limited to and exclusive . . . over appeals of cases arising under the federal tax laws.  
Sacrificed in the process, necessarily, is the leavening influence of the generalist appellate judge.  
Taking account of what our Internal Revenue Code and regulations have become, and likely will 
remain, I think it a price worth paying.”).
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encounter tax appeals.179  Expertise alone, therefore, may well reduce the number of inconsistent 
tax law interpretations.180
Finally, there is no reason to believe that the Federal Circuit would become a tool of the
IRS.  “No tax venue restrains the IRS’s aggression and power better than the Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals.  Other tax venues lack the Federal Circuit’s history and monetary-claim 
179Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 188 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Every 
experienced tax practitioner also knows that our Internal Revenue Code is a structured and 
complicated instrument perhaps too complex that deserves careful and historical analysis when, 
as here, longstanding provisions of that Code are challenged.”); Koss v. United States, 69 F.3d 
705, 712 (3d Cir. 1995) (“We cannot close this opinion without making an additional 
observation.   It is, of course, commonplace to note that the Internal Revenue Code is remarkably 
complicated.   In this case, these complications have cost the Kosses dearly.  Indeed, at oral 
argument we were told that their debt to the IRS now exceeds $300,000 because of the inclusion 
of interest.   Yet it is very possible that, but for the operation of the non-substantive, highly 
technical procedural provisions that have been applied, they would not owe this money.  We are 
disturbed by the harsh result.”)   
180Congress created the Federal Circuit to achieve consistency in patent cases by avoiding 
the “contradictory decisions often issued by the 12 existing Courts of Appeal and seldom 
untangled by the Supreme Court.”  Paula Dwyer, et al., The Battle Raging Over “Intellectual 
Property,” BUS. WK., May 2, 1989, at 79.
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expertise.  The Federal Circuit specializes in bringing uniform justice to disputes between the 
United States and its citizens.”181
V. Conclusion
The Internal Revenue Code is interpreted by thirteen different circuit courts.  The circuit 
courts’ interpretations, though, are not always in accord, but they are usually final, as the 
Supreme Court rarely hears tax appeals.182  As a result, the IRS is often forced to apply different 
tax laws in different circuits in violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the Uniformity Clause of 
the Constitution.  But there is a simple, practical, and constitutional solution to this problem.  
This Article proposes that Congress amend 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a) by adding a provision 
granting exclusive jurisdiction of federal tax appeals to the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.  Such an amendment would not only unify and stabilize the tax law, it would 
permanently solve the Uniformity Clause issue identified in this Article.
181Christopher R. Egan, Checking the Beast: Why the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Is 
Good for the Federal System of Tax Litigation, 56 SMU L. REV. 721, 743-44 (2003).
182
“‘This is a tax case.  Deny.’  This was [Justice’s] Brennan’s normal reaction to a cert 
request in a tax case.”  BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE 
SUPREME COURT 429 (1979).  See also See Commission on Structural Alternatives for the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, supra note 168 (infrequent Supreme Court review of tax cases often 
leaves the interpretation of the tax law unsettled for years).
